Literature, most notably in anthropology and international law, has explored experiences and contributions of local-level actors in efforts to realise international human rights. This article contributes a new and complementary perspective to one aspect of this scholarship, on the localisation of international rights language. It focuses on the localisation of legal language in a European context. It explores claims by civil society actors about the applicability of legal human rights standards, drawing upon data generated during the participative mapping process that underpinned Scotland's first National Human Rights Action Plan. The article provides a qualitative case-study of engagements with three particular rights -the right to life, the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to respect for private and family life. It finds significant evidence of civil society actors using the language of human rights law to anchor interpretive claims about how the rights should apply, in a way that is prescribed, but not defined by, authoritative institutional interpretations. The case-study reveals how interpretive engagement with human rights law corresponds to a sense of entitlement to use the language of international human rights. It thereby contributes to a richer understanding of the drivers of, and risks to, local-level ownership of human rights language, highlighting insights for both scholarship and human rights advocacy.
Introduction
Questions about how different actors use human rights language to advance individual or collective claims speak to the relevance of supranational human rights law beyond institutional contexts. In recent decades such questions have most notably been critiqued in scholarship in anthropology and in international law. Anthropology as a discipline has seen a shift from a degree of scepticism about human rights to another "wave" 1 of work, which has included examination of the international human rights system in practice. 2 One focus has been on processes of 'localisation' 3 , on how "transnational concepts and language are deployed in their contexts of reception". 4 Alongside these perspectives, international law scholarship has highlighted human rights 'from below', primarily in response to economic globalisation. 5 Questions about the use of human rights language have often been asked in the context of grassroots activism and social movements -of "counter-culture". 6 The focus has been on the use of human rights language as political discourse, predominantly based on studies in the Global South 7 and the United States. 8 Other literature from a socio-legal perspective has emphasised the desirability of exploring empirical realities of human rights implementation at the national level. 9 Socio-legal literature has a strong history of emphasising the workings of law in practice and exploring lay peoples' shaping of law 10 , and it has developed a focus on international human rights law relatively recently. 11 A key contribution of the literature across these fields has been to foreground questions of human rights in practice through a socio-legal lens 12 and to highlight the experiences and roles of local actors. 13 In this article, we advocate a different and complementary direction within the literature by bringing together a focus on law and local-level engagement with human rights from a European perspective. We explore how civil society actors in Scotland invoke supranational (regional/international) legal standards to support claims of human rights As little is known about what local-level engagement with supranational human rights law looks like, including in states that might be considered to have relatively advanced levels of rights protection, we do not know how this kind of engagement might relate to a sense of entitlement to use, and ownership over, rights language. Yet this is vital. Both are elements of translating supranational standards into increased protection in local contexts, where rights matter most. Knowing more about these processes can provide insights for advocates who wish to tailor their interventions to promote ownership of rights language, and can inform our understanding of how such ownership impacts on progress towards rights realisation.
We focus on how civil society actors framed their own or others' experiences using the language of three legal human rights standards. The examples used, within a qualitative case-study approach, are the right to respect for private and family life, the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to life. In the first section below we say more about rights 'ownership' and the significance of a focus on law. In the main section we outline our approach and the parameters of the research data before analysing the key findings. We highlight two themes for analysis: the nature and depth of claims made, and the extent to which these claims push the boundaries of authoritative, institutional interpretations. We find evidence of civil society actors using the language of human rights law to ground interpretive claims about how the rights should apply, in a way that is prescribed but not defined by institutional interpretations. This, we argue, corresponds to a sophisticated sense of entitlement to use the language of human rights law. In the third section we bring together insights for scholarship and human rights advocacy.
Rights realisation and ownership of human rights law in local contexts
Human rights advocates suggest that local ownership of international rights language is an essential component of 'making rights real'. 14 As Merry notes: "The impact of human rights law depends, as does all law, on changing local consciousness of rights and relationships." 15 The conviction that rights-holders themselves should feel able to, and be supported in, "appropriating" 16 their rights is evident in public outreach programs and rights education campaigns. It is recognised that "[h]uman rights can only be achieved through an informed and continued demand by people for their protection". 17 The UN promotes human rights education, including through campaigns around particular treaties. 18 It gives a special role to national human rights institutions (NHRIs), seen as bridges between national contexts and the UN/regional systems. Both demonstrate the importance it gives to reaching out to the public to promote human rights. Congruent with the emphasis placed on appropriating rights language is the individual empowerment inherent in the conceptualisation of the liberal, rights-bearing subject; a conceptualisation that has been argued to underpin the modern human rights regime. 19 Human rights differ from other kinds of legal rights in this symbolic prominence that they give to the empowerment aspect of the holding and claiming of rights against the state. A sense of entitlement to claim, and ownership over, supranational human rights language is seen as essential. At the moment, however, we do not know enough about how entitlement and ownership are impacted by engagement with human rights law.
Examining engagement with law can help to answer conceptual and practical questions about ownership of rights language because law is the backbone of the human rights regime as it has taken shape internationally over the past seventy years. The centrality of "tyrannosaurus lex" 20 within the international human rights system has rightly been critiqued, and the legal formulation of rights is but one aspect of a broader conceptualisation of human rights as a transnational discursive practice 21 , but at the same time rights-advocates call upon the legal standards. These standards hold the possibility of official stamps of validity 22 , accountability 23 , and remedies. 24 The promise of law's protection remains attractive. 25 To explore engagement with human rights law we draw upon data generated during the participative, multi-stakeholder process that provided the evidence base for Scotland's first National Human Rights Action Plan. This process, led by an NHRI, the Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC), aimed to capture the perspectives of rights-holders, civil society organisations (CSOs) and academics on good practice and gaps in respect of the range of internationally recognised human rights. National processes of mapping evidence of rights realisation to underpin action plans is a relatively new and developing context. 26 This is not a context of contentious disputes; instead it invites, because of its consultative, participative, evidence-gathering nature, micro-level engagements with the meaning and scope of particular rights.
In this context we can explore how different actors engage with human rights law -an approach that does not detract from but complements some of the less "juro-centric" 27 approaches to exploring processes of human rights localisation. Our question is, how did participants in Scotland's process use the language of human rights law to frame assertions about gaps in respect for rights?
The Case-study: Human rights law in the Scottish mapping process
Approach to the data
We explore how participants in the mapping engaged with the meaning of the rights to respect for private/family life, freedom from inhuman/degrading treatment, and the right to
life by examining what they say about, and the kinds of circumstances that they link to, these particular standards. Participative baseline mapping processes provide interesting material for analysing a wide range of questions. For example, how often participants engage with the process without using the term human rights at all or without referencing human rights in a legal way; which category of participants are most or least likely to invoke rights (including in a legal way); and whether the nature of the language used by participants impacts upon the likelihood of their contributions being picked up by the NHRI. Presently, however, we intentionally adopt a different focus in order to learn about the dynamics of participants' interaction with law in this unique context. We aim to better understand the implications thereof for the phenomenon of ownership of the language of human rights law.
We selected the rights to respect for private/family life, freedom from inhuman/degrading treatment, and the right to life for inclusion in the case-study. We sought standards composed of distinctive legal rights language, which would allow us to efficiently identify relevant engagements within the data; we sought rights that were included in the domestic legal framework of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights 28 ; and we sought rights composed of terms/ideas that were emotive and potentially familiar to a wide range of participants who were not necessarily legal experts.
Whilst several other rights were considered (and would be interesting to analyse in future research, including socio-economic rights), we deemed the chosen standards, and the selection of three different examples, to embody the appropriate balance between time constraints of the study and its objectives.
We undertake a qualitative case-study of two existing data-sets, which represent key points in the exercise of mapping rights realisation in Scotland. They provide direct insight into how rights were discussed by a wide range of individuals and groups, whether they specialised in rights protection and promotion or not. In the analysis, participants are anonymised or identified by name depending on the data source and the permissions obtained by the SHRC (which included permissions for the data to be reused). In order to maintain the confidentiality that was assured when seeking consent to participate, the identities of individuals and groups involved in the consultation events (A) were protected. All groups were informed about the project in writing prior to the focus groups and interviews and key contacts were asked to provide this information to their group members. In order to ensure informed consent, this information was again provided in writing and explained to each participant and interviewee prior to the focus group or interview commencing. Below, we identify participants by a descriptor, mirroring the source documents. Each group/individual referenced in data-set (B) consented in writing to their responses being published.
In conducting the analysis, we made a decision about keyword terms and compiled a list of instances of these in each data-set. The keywords differ depending on the right in question. In order to maximise capture of relevant references, we accounted for variations in how we anticipated participants might use the language. In respect of the right to life, we searched for the precise phrase, whereas in respect of the right to respect for private and family life, we searched separately for 'private life' and 'family life' as well as 'privacy', and in respect of the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, we searched more broadly using the keywords 'inhuman*' and 'degrad*'. We individually examined all references returned in the context of the surrounding text and noted emerging themes. We reexamined the relevant parts of the data and jointly compiled an unstructured list of initial points of interest. We again re-examined the relevant parts of the data alongside this list and manually coded the data, resulting in the grouping and labelling of a number of categories.
We considered these categories alongside the initial, flexible themes that we had previously identified and confirmed or modified the themes accordingly.
We acknowledge our own role in interpreting participants' ways of talking about the rights in this case-study. Our previous knowledge of the law plays a role, given that we are asking how participants use the language of the rights. Seeing the data through our own perspectives -a combination of academic knowledge, of community legal practice experience, and of being close to the evidence-gathering process (as a member of the SHRC's
Research Advisory Group and as its former Communications and Outreach Officer 31 ) -does not, in our view, create any conflict with the analysis presented here. We have aimed to manage any potential bias through a reflexive approach. Table 2 presents an overview of the search results. We do not focus on how often the keywords arise; instead we consider in depth how civil society actors use the terms. Of the one hundred and twenty-three total returns, for the three rights considered across both datasets, we excluded fifty-four. We determined exclusions according to several criteria, including, for example, irrelevant uses of the terms. At this stage we also excluded from analysis invocations that we identified as naturalistic, or 'non-legalistic', uses of the search terms, given our focus on legal language. 36 We excluded only eight out of the total of fiftyfour exclusions on this basis; the vast majority of exclusions were for other reasons. 37 We erred on the side of caution in making these determinations, so as to avoid including in the analysis those references that may have been, but were not indisputably, a use of legalistic language. For example, in a focus group discussion a participant with experience of working in care homes uses the term 'degrading' in describing his concerns about the institutional care of older persons. Recounting his experiences, he describes it as degrading for the women in the home that he, a man, was the only person designated to help them to the toilet. 38 His description of the unacceptable circumstances might be evidence of incidental engagement with a legal human rights term or it might be evidence of his awareness of the legal frame within which the consultation is taking place. Similarly, in another group a participant describes as 'degrading' a situation in which disabled persons had been required to give their weight and the weight of their wheelchair when booking taxi services. 39 Again, this might reflect that the context of consulting about the state of rights realisation presented a human rights law frame and so implicitly validated the use of this language if participants were familiar with it. This is plausible and would be interesting to explore in a different context. Another organisational respondent advocates a health and social care integration approach that:
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Overview of results
[…] respects people's right to private and family life and strives to enable people to be included as citizens who enjoy the right to independent living.
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In such examples, participants plainly engage with rights language in a legalistic way. Further examples will be seen in the analysis.
We explore two key themes: the depth and reach of legalistic claims; and the extent to which claims are implicitly or explicitly descriptive of already-existing authoritative interpretations, or are prescriptive of new directions in the scope of the rights. Embedded in these themes are insights about how local actors engage with, navigate, and appropriate the language of legal standards.
The nature of legalistic claims
The language of rights might be invoked in different ways. Goodale, in research on rights discourse in Bolivia, describes how rights language might be used in connotative or denotative ways, echoing a distinction commonly found in philosophy, linguistics and semiotics, and cultural theory. 43 Human rights have connotative power when individuals or groups "gesture toward" broad human rights ideas; they have denotative power when individuals or groups invoke specific standards. 44 Legalistic uses of rights language are inherently denotative. But denotative claims can themselves be more or less specific and more or less developed: they might lean towards being superficially legalistic or they might be more interpretive (i.e. making and justifying connections to specific experiences). The nature of the legalistic uses of rights language is a key theme in the data. The majority of participants, in relation to all three case-study rights, refer to those rights in ways that develop connections to specific circumstances.
One respondent who refers to the "right to family life" links it specifically to changes in immigration rules relating to income thresholds and settlement of non-national partners of migrant workers, and highlights the impact of these rules on family unification:
A threshold of £18,600 rising to £22,400 for one child with an extra £2,400 for each additional child, places a substantial income bar on the right to family life. 45 In other responses, participants make specific connections to the right to respect for private and family life that include inadequate support and assessment of parental capacity 46 ; lack of access to housing and discrimination on the basis of age in the private housing market 47 ; lack of options for intersex people to adopt children 48 ; lack of independent legal representation for sexual offence complainers; 49 insufficient attention to securing emotional nurture for lookedafter children and young people 50 ; and use of a "mosquito" device by the police service as an anti-social behaviour management tool. 51 All of these are linked to legalistic references to the right. In relation to the right to life, in one instance a link is made to fuel poverty and failure of governmental intervention 52 ; in another example a participant states:
I believe that the issue of homeless people should be addressed in Scotland. It is quite a common thing to see around the streets in Edinburgh even in the harsher months of winter time. To this extent, a socio-economic dimension of the right to life should be taken into account. In relation to the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, participants make connections that act to justify that specific harms merit this particular label. One respondent, criticising a National Health Service practice of sending patients to England for treatment, writes:
This means continuing to send people in severe pain on 1,000 mile return journeys
[…] surely breaching "degrading and inhumane treatment" stipulations. 54 should mean. Other respondents who directly invoke inhuman/degrading treatment also justify a link by expanding upon the characteristics of particular experiences:
[…] we know that degrading and inhuman treatment and being punished for things that no other citizen would be punished for are common in care settings and through the care systems. People with learning disabilities, especially in care settings but sometimes in family homes with informal carers, are kept in a child-like, dependent, state; being told what they must do, having to ask permission for nearly everything they do and punished if they disobey the sometimes complicated rules they have to follow. This is not the experience of everyone but it happens to people with learning disabilities much more often than to any other citizen and is acknowledged by most research and investigation. 
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This participant continues with an illustrative example of the experience of one family.
Across the contributions there is significant evidence of particular links being made to particular rights.
Such engagements are more than superficial invocations of rights language. They go much further than "allusive reference to the idea of human rights". 59 They are claims that the language of a right, expressed in broad terms and fluid in its meaning, should encompass particular experiences situated in particular localities. They can be described as extra-judicial interpretations 60 of human rights law. Extra-judicial interpreters are any actors, beyond judicial/quasi-judicial institutions, who make claims about how the words within a legal standard should be fleshed out into concrete protections (even if the idea of interpretation in human rights law is overwhelmingly associated with formal contexts of monitoring and adjudication). 61 Indeed it is extra-judicial interpretation that drives initial institutional engagement with the scope of a right. As De Feyter reminds us, rights are given life through claims anchored in local sites of harm where rights-holders actually experience what they perceive to be violations. 62 Interpretive claims link experiences to rights standards, generating new understandings of those rights. The advantage of understanding claims in the case-study as interpretations is that it emphasises that they connect specific lived experience to specific legal rights.
Integral to the possibility of interpretive claim-making is a sense of entitlement to engage in this way with the legal standards. This is the key point. Interpretive claims rest upon an integral, underpinning appropriation of the legal language. This is so even if not consciously articulated. By their nature, claims that attempt to give substance, through specific connections, to the sometimes broad and always fluid text of a legal standard must be founded upon a sense of prerogative to talk about human rights law in this way. When interpretive claims are voiced, a sense of entitlement is inherent.
To reiterate, we focus on how the language was used. We cannot, in any case, know from this data why interpretive claims were made. Here, we draw out two insights concerning knowledge and context, which are relevant to understanding the ways in which interpretive claims were made.
Firstly, knowledge of supranational human rights law language was widely spread and certainly not exclusive to the NHRI. We see some of Merry's insights, from research on the interrelation between local activism and transnational human rights fora, playing out here at a more micro-level and in this slightly narrower context of engagement with legal language.
Merry identifies a category of intermediary translators ("national political elites, human rights lawyers, feminist activists and movement leaders, social workers and other service providers, and academics") 63 , who occupy a middle ground, facilitating linkages between international rights discourse and local experiences. There are echoes of these insights. The voices of some of these kinds of actors are present in our case-study; for example, one participant selfidentifies as a human rights lawyer, there is an academic-led group, and there are individuals who we infer are activists. Some participants might see themselves as 'translating', packaging others' experiences into a "meta-language" 64 (as observed in socio-legal research) of human rights. There are examples, although very limited, in which participants refer to their internal consultations which fed into the mapping process. 65 There are also differences: In our casestudy, there are participants who make interpretive legalistic claims who could not be described as activists, and so on; the range of those using the language of supranational human rights law is broad, from local authorities to youth organisations, to small groups close to the grassroots as well as non-affiliated individuals. Also, even if some participants see themselves as "navigating a divide" 66 , it would seem to be between those for whom they advocate and the NHRI/duty-bearer audience, rather than transnational fora. There is no explicit evidence of any having one foot in the supranational arena (for some, such as a local authority, this seems unlikely), although the experience of individuals (including within organisations) could be important. What we do see, is not a physical foot in the camp of supranational fora, but a knowledge connection to supranational (in particular, regional)
human rights law. The consultative mapping context, with the focus on supranational human rights law, is a different frame of engagement and yet we see some of Merry's insights reflected therein, with a variation on the kinds of knowledge and the location this knowledge.
In summary, a range of different kinds of actors had sufficient knowledge of human rights law language to be able to invoke it as part of interpretive claims.
Secondly, the legal language tended not to be used in conjunction with demands for judicial remedies. In the written consultation responses there is some appeal to adjudicatory Logically, interpretive claims also coincide with knowledge of legal language, and this was evidenced in the range of different kinds of actors, not restricted to a top-tier of experts, who used the language of the case-study rights. Civil society actors' engagement with legal language tended to be accompanied by demands, not for legal remedies, but for accountability outside of the legal sphere. This indicates that interpreters had an appreciation of how the legal standards might usefully be invoked locally. Knowledge of these standards then, was placed within the local policy/practice context.
The influence of authoritative interpretations
If local actors interpret rights, this raises questions about how these interpretations interact with authoritative interpretations. De Feyter and Parmentier, in their introduction to The
Local Relevance of Human Rights, note this book's concern with whether local invocations of rights "coincided" with "legal definition[s]". 74 A key theme found in the mapping datawhich is an extension of the first examined above -is the extent to which participants who make assertions about the applicability of the rights do so in a way that mirrors or exceeds judicially-sanctioned fields of application. That is, the extent to which they, implicitly or explicitly, defer to fields of application that have been institutionally recognised (by national courts or by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the most immediate sources of human rights law in the UK in respect of the case-study rights), or entail more radical claims that challenge current boundaries of applicability of the rights. To take the example of inhuman/degrading treatment, an instance of the former type of claim might be rules governing maximum cell occupancy and hygiene provision for prisoners in state detention, and of the latter, rules governing the withdrawal of state social security benefits on the basis of missed appointments regarding out-of-work benefits. In the data analysed, participants tend to show prescriptive, but not radical ways of talking about the rights and their applicability.
This is seen in a claim relating to a gap in protection of the right to respect for family life -inadequate support and assessment of capacity for parents with learning disabilities.
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The ECtHR, in 2017, found a violation of Article 8 ECHR due to a state's failure to take adequate steps to facilitate contact with a hearing-impaired parent. 76 Another respondent, referring also to family life, links it to options for intersex people to adopt children. 78 This pushes the boundaries of the right's applicability beyond established fields of recognition of transsexual identities and adoption of children by homosexual couples. 79 Similarly, one organisation describes minimum financial requirements imposed by immigration rules as incongruent with respect for family life. There was at the time broad civil society criticism of the rules, which were only later challenged judicially. 80 Other examples are diverse: from a lack of independent legal representation for sexual offence complainers 81 , to sharing of information amongst professionals about young people in the care of the state 82 . Despite this diversity, it is notable how often participants make claims that were at that time not quite radical, yet still prescriptive.
Similar claims are seen in respect of the other rights. For example, the treatment of persons with autism spectrum disorders within the mental health system is described by one organisation as treatment that could "undoubtedly be categorised as cruel, inhuman and Croatia. 85 The Article 3 aspect of the former case concerned the living conditions of a man diagnosed with schizophrenia within a social care institution, and the latter, persistent harassment of a man with mental and physical disabilities by private persons. The respondents make no explicit reference to any national, European, or international decisions.
Another group does make reference to the Đorđević decision in the context of a claim concerning disability-related hate-crime:
[…] some hate crimes will reach the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which is prohibited under Article 3 of the ECHR.
In the recent case of Dordevic v Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights found that acts of harassment taken in their entirety may breach the threshold of Article 3
and that Croatia failed to protect this right because "No serious attempt was made to assess the true nature of the situation complained of, and to assess the lack of a systematic approach which resulted in the absence of adequate and comprehensive measures". 86 Another participant refers to the scope of "freedom from degrading treatment" in relation to male domestic abuse. This right had at that time been used in the ECHR system to widen states' duties in respect of violence against women. 87 Similarly, a participant who refers to Scottish Gypsy Travellers invokes the "right not to be tortured or inhumanly or degradingly treated or punished" and continues: "This includes living in substandard or squalid conditions such as those involving 'slopping out' or living on the roadside with no basic service provision. Many Scottish Gypsy Travellers are living in such conditions." 88 This is a prescriptive connection to officially recognised fields of application -situations of destitution 89 and inadequate sanitation in detention (the reference to 'slopping out' is an implicit reference to a Scottish court decision in Napier v. Scottish Ministers, which found a violation of Article 3 ECHR). 90 Interaction with authoritative interpretations is also reflected in claims related to the right to life, in which it is linked to homelessness in Scotland and to fuel poverty. 91 In the examples highlighted there are different degrees of implicit or explicit reference to existing official interpretations.
To the best of our knowledge these are claims that expanded recognised fields of application of the rights. These participants make connections between particular experiences and the legal rights in a way that pushes the boundaries of the rights' interpretation, yet in a way that resonates with their existing stages of interpretive development. These are claims that are neither ambitiously prescriptive, nor purely descriptive. We might have expected participants to appeal to the visionary capacity of rights; their claims being characterised more by aspiration than official judicial understandings. However, none of the interpretations of the case-study rights could be described as radical.
Here again we can draw out two insights concerning knowledge and context, relevant to understanding the nature of these claims.
A tendency towards balance between description and prescription indicates diffuse human rights knowledge. Where interpretations by courts are not explicitly invoked, but where claims nevertheless tend towards non-radical extensions of a court's existing approach, this balance could have been coincidental. It is more likely, we argue, that is reveals tacit knowledge. That is, knowledge circulating within the local advocacy culture of the kinds of things that the rights 'officially' protected against.
A tendency towards balance also shows that human rights law language was used in a measured way. Claims are not far-fetched; they tend to be "plausible". 92 Arguably, this is a reflection of the nature and objectives of the mapping process. The mapping was intended to underpin achievable change by national duty-bearers. Claims that were plausible had a greater chance of being taken seriously. On the one hand, this kind of measured invocation of human rights law might result in a loss of radical potential. 93 It might constrain the possibility of cutting-edge extra-judicial interpretations. Such interpretations are important because local-level experiences motivate legal change. On the other hand, this kind of measured use of human rights law might be positive from the perspective of longer-term ownership of rights language. There is perhaps a greater probability that such claims will be acted upon.
Merry highlights the significance of this as an aspect of fostering human rights empowerment. The possibility of implementation, she argues, is "fundamental to establishing human rights consciousness." 94 And not just the possibility of implementation, but the possibility of official responsiveness: discussing the vulnerability of nascent individual rights consciousness, Merry finds that "only if there is institutional support for this perspective will this new subjectivity be sustained." 95 In summary, actors invoking the case-study rights did not use the process as a forum for radical creativity. This suggests official understandings of the rights were navigated based on either explicit or tacit knowledge circulating within the local advocacy culture. From the perspective of fostering a sense of entitlement to appropriate the language of rights, a tendency towards making plausible interpretive claims gives rise to some perils, but also promise.
The role of NHRIs
The case-study shows civil society actors in Scotland using human rights law to anchor but not define interpretive claims. We have explained this kind of engagement with reference to a diffuse circulation of knowledge about legal standards, placed within the local context. We argue that this kind of legalistic interpretative engagement with the open language of rights is bound up with a sense of entitlement to make claims about how they should be understood and why they should apply in particular contexts. As such, it can be conducive to promoting a sense of local-level ownership of rights language.
These findings are relevant to the work of NHRIs (and other rights-promoting organisations) and highlight space for new perspectives. They urge NHRIs to consider their potentially positive role in supporting engagement with law. The findings suggest that the participative consultation process in Scotland encouraged the making of interpretive claims.
Not only were participants asked for their views on how rights were being undermined, but the SHRC explicitly tied the mapping exercise to supranational legal standards. It observed during the process that rights-holders' knowledge of "human rights laws and principles"
would be a key driver of local-level appeals to human rights. 98 Such an approach may have encouraged participants to appropriate the legal language. This is exemplified in a comment made by one interviewee: "I was looking at this last night, this freedom from degrading treatment […]". 99 It is possible that the SHRC's approach of linking to supranational standards, in a participative process, contributed to a culture in which the language of human rights law was 'up for grabs'.
Whilst NHRIs might be comfortable using human rights law as a framework, they should also consider the potential benefits in concrete interactions. There may be a perception that talking about law will alienate rather than encourage local-level ownership, but our findings do not support this. There may be a perception that talking about law means favouring snail-pace judicial remedies that might never materialise, but our findings indicate that a legalistic approach can be bound up with a sense of entitlement to use rights language without being bound up with a focus on judicialised remedies. Further, rights-promoting organisations should continue to seek strategies for supporting local actors who want to develop legalistic interpretive claims. One such strategy might be to cultivate a greater engagement with the actual meaning of human rights language. In the case-study it is striking that participants do not make any reference to the meaning of the words themselves:
'privacy', 'private', 'family', 'inhuman', 'degrading', or 'life'. We might have expected participants to express a sense of emotional identification, which would translate into a focus on ideas like the essence of family, personal autonomy, inferiority or humiliation. Instead, they talk about the rights in a way that focuses on their applicability. This might be because they are reticent to engage in 'inappropriate' emotional ways with the terms of the rights.
However this might be explained, the findings show that participants were not openly motivated by the meaning of the words, yet the value-base of rights language is a potential resource. 100 Adding an element of more direct engagement with meanings of ideas like humiliation or personal integrity 101 and so on, could support a sense of entitlement because ideas like these are often intuitively understood. Doing so could also provide NHRIs with a different perspective from which to navigate institutional interpretations -it is generally accepted that such organisations should communicate human rights law to the public in simple ways 102 , but this need not mean rights standards should be devoid of conceptual substance or reduced to a series of authoritative examples.
The findings suggest that NHRIs and similar bodies should be aware of how they In light of the case-study, the question of how NHRIs engage with law, when navigating between institutional and aspirational understandings of rights, promoting empowerment of rights-holders and accountability of duty-bearers 104 , seems significant to the success of their objective of improving local rights ownership. There is space to integrate this question into the vibrant literature on NHRI effectiveness and impact. 105 This question moves
beyond concern with what has been described as the limitations of "excessive legalism" 106 in the practice of NHRIs, to re-inject a different kind of focus on law.
Conclusion
We have aimed to provide a new perspective on the relevance of human rights norms to the localisation scholarship. We have focused on a denotative form of engagement with human rights law in the unique context of an NHRI-led baseline mapping process in Scotland. This process provided a forum in which local actors were invited to express a view on how the often-fluid language of supranational human rights law should connect to experiences on the ground. The case-study thereby contributes to an understanding of localisation processes. It evidences the making of legalistic interpretive claims within a multi-level knowledge context, embedded in a local policy and practice landscape. It suggests that these legalistic interpretive engagements are bound up with a sense of entitlement to use the language of rights.
We have highlighted how our findings reflect some elements of, and complement, two of Merry's key insights (in relation to intermediary translators and the impact of authorities' responses on the stability of rights consciousness) and the case-study itself reflects an underpinning understanding of local civil society actors as valid interpreters of human rights.
Yngvesson's observation that law's essence "is not simply invented at the top but is 
